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Reforms in Moldova: 
Moderate progress and an uncertain outlook for the future
Kamil Całus
After coming to power in September 2009, the Alliance for European Integration (AIE)1 coalition 
began implementing a wide-ranging programme of reforms, with a view to bringing Moldova 
closer to the European Union, and ultimately to ensure the country’s full membership of the EU. 
Today, Moldova is considered a clear leader in European integration among the members of the EU’s 
Eastern Partnership programme. This, however, has less to do with the concrete reforms introduced 
by the Moldovan government, and more to do with, on the one hand, Chișinău’s excellent public 
relations with Brussels, achieved through effective diplomacy; and on the other hand, the growing 
disillusionment with the lack of progress in other Eastern Partnership countries, particularly in Ukraine.
Attempts to evaluate Moldova’s reforms have proven rather problematic. On the one hand, 
the ruling coalition has managed to make significant progress in the areas of civil liberties, human 
rights and electoral reform. The government has also successfully implemented regulations 
which have brought Moldova closer to signing a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement 
(DCFTA) with the EU, and it has made headway in talks on visa liberalisation with Brussels. 
On the other hand, Chișinău has still not carried out the structural and economic reforms without 
which real change in the country will be impossible. No reforms have been introduced in the 
Ministry of the Interior, the Moldovan police force, or the judiciary. The AIE has also failed to 
decentralise governance and has had no real success in reducing corruption; its attempts to rebuild 
the country’s financial institutions have proved equally unsuccessful. The main reasons for this 
poor performance include mutual mistrust and conflicting interests among the coalition members, 
a shortage of financial resources, strong resistance to change by public administration staff, and 
significant pressure from those political and business groups whose interests could suffer as a result 
of the proposed reforms. It should also be noted that since the AIE took power, the international 
context of the reform efforts has undergone significant changes. On the one hand, the EU has been 
facing an economic crisis, which has had a negative impact on Moldovan exports and contributed 
to the worsening of the economic situation in the country; and on the other hand, Moldova has 
been offered membership of the Customs Union as a viable alternative to EU membership. 
The ineffective and only partly implemented 
reforms have led to a rise in social1discontent. 
Currently, up to 72% of Moldovans believe that 
1 Initially, the AIE was formed by four parties; after 
an early parliamentary election in November 2010, how-
ever, ‘Our Moldova’, the smallest of the coalition partners, 
failed to pass the electoral threshold. As a result, the coa-
lition currently consists of three parties: the Liberal Party, 
the Democratic Party and the Liberal Democratic Party.
the country is heading in the wrong direction2, 
which has led to a drop in support for EU 
membership and a rise in support for Moldova’s 
future within the Customs Union. In the long 
term, this could lead to a change of government, 
2	 Barometrul	de	Opinie	Publică	–	Noiembrie	2012;	http://
www.ipp.md/public/files/Barometru/BOP_11.2012_pri-
ma_parte.pdf, page 7.
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and a shift from a pro-Western to a pro-Russian 
orientation in Moldova’s foreign policy. 
Institutional reforms
A	 substantial	 reform	 of	 state	 institutions	 –	
including the Ministry of the Interior, the 
police force, and the Ministry of Justice, as 
well as changes to public administration, local 
government	and	election	law	–	are	essential	for	the	
former Soviet republics to transition successfully 
to Western-style democracies. So far, Georgia is 
the only post-Soviet state that has successfully 
reformed its institutions and undergone 
a full transformation resulting in the adoption 
of the Western political and economic model3.
Reform of the Ministry of the Interior, 
including structural and administrative changes 
within the MOI and within the Moldovan 
police force, is the main challenge facing the 
government	 in	 Chișinău.	 Its	 most	 important	
task lies in the complete restructuring of 
a corrupt and highly inefficient Ministry inherited 
from the Soviet era. The measures taken to this 
end include the demilitarisation of the MOI 
through the replacement of military ranks with 
police ranks, the restructuring of the Carabinieri 
(internal troops), a clear separation of powers 
between the Carabinieri and the police, and the 
establishment of an independent department 
monitoring the work of the police. This last 
change is particularly important, as it would 
protect the police from political pressure and 
greatly improve their professionalism. The new 
3 For more on the subject of Georgian reforms and their 
effectiveness, see Marek Matusiak, ‘Georgian dilemmas. 
Between a strong state and democracy’, Point of View, 
No. 29, July 2012, http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/
files/PW_29_EN.pdf
department would oversee the work of law 
enforcement agencies and conduct regular 
training. The head of the department would be 
appointed for a fixed five-year term, without 
the possibility of dismissal, while the rest of 
the staff would be appointed by competition. 
Reform of the MOI and the police force is 
essential in order to convince the Moldovan 
people of the effectiveness of the broader socio-
political changes facing the country. Currently, 
Moldovan police officers are considered to be 
one of the most corrupt groups of public servants 
in the country (41.2% of Moldovans have 
at some point bribed a police officer); public 
confidence in the police remains at 25%4.
So far, however, only minor changes have been 
implemented at the Ministry of the Interior. 
These include the creation of a new border 
police force falling under the MOI, and a partial 
demilitarisation of the Ministry’s administrative 
structures, significantly reducing the number of 
military personnel (in July 2012, the first ever 
civilian was appointed as head of the Ministry 
of the Interior). Meanwhile, the planned reform 
of the police force has not yet been launched 
and remains under consultation in Parliament. 
Public confidence levels in the Moldovan justice 
system, on the other hand, are even lower, 
and do not exceed 15%5. Extensive reform 
of the judiciary began in December 2011 with 
the	adoption	of	an	Action	Plan	for	2011–2016;	
its aim was to improve the effectiveness of 
the justice system, reduce corruption, guard 
it against political influence, and increase its 
efficiency (by reducing the number of judges). 
The widespread corruption affecting the courts, 
the prosecution service, and other departments 
under the Ministry of Justice, poses a major 
challenge to the success of this reform. The main 
difficulty in dealing with this issue lies in the 
very structure of the Ministry, which (also due 
to its close ties with the Moldovan political elite) 
resists the implementation of anti-corruption 
4	 ‘Transparency	 International	 –	 Moldova,	 A	 Sociological	
Study. Corruption In the Republic of Moldova: Percep-
tions vs. Personal Experiences of Households and Busi-
ness	People’,	Chișinău	2012.
5 Ibid.
A substantial reform of state institutions 
– including the Ministry of the Interior 
and the police force– are essential for the 
former Soviet republics to transition suc-
cessfully to Western-style democracies.
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measures. As a result, both existing and new 
legal provisions (including the removal of 
immunity for judges accused of accepting bribes) 
have not only failed to improve the situation, 
but have also been unsuccessful in preventing 
a further escalation of the problem.
Structural reform of the judiciary has only just 
begun; so far, the number of judges has been 
reduced, separate economic courts have been 
closed down and their cases have been passed on 
to specialised departments within regular courts, 
and the number of Supreme Court judges has 
been cut down. Despite EU pressure, however, 
judicial salaries have not been increased, even 
though better pay could significantly reduce 
the prevalence of corruption.
Meanwhile, the changes to Moldova’s 
election law and the restructuring of 
the Central Electoral Commission (CEC), 
initiated at the end of 2009, have proved quite 
successful. Significant personnel changes and 
the establishment of the Centre for Continuing 
Professional Development, aiming to raise the 
level of professionalism and ensure the CEC 
staff’s ethical conduct, have had a positive 
impact on the overall quality of the electoral 
process. In addition, amendments to the 
Electoral Code have lowered the election 
threshold to 4% for political parties and 2% 
for independent candidates running without 
the backing of a party. The amended Electoral 
Code has also brought back the regulations 
permitting the formation of political coalitions. 
However, the funding of political parties and 
election campaigns remains an unresolved 
issue, and so far no new regulations have been 
introduced to address it. The current system 
lacks transparency and allows for undeclared 
political donations; no effective system has 
been put in place to monitor party budgets and 
the financing of election campaigns.
Preparations for administrative reform, 
designed to decentralise the state and thus 
create a basis for stronger local authorities, 
which would further bolster the development 
of Moldovan civil society, began in January 2012 
as part of a National Strategy for Decentralisation. 
The document proposes the transfer of certain 
powers from central government to local 
authorities, especially local councils, and 
offers them greater control over their budgets 
(including the right to set local taxes and 
the right to retain any income generated from 
the lease of land or property). Despite attempts 
to implement the decentralisation policy, 
the effects of Moldova’s administrative reform 
have so far been negligible. This has mainly 
been caused by the reluctance of local councils 
to take independent decisions, and of central 
government to give up some of its powers. 
The process has also been negatively affected 
by the politicisation of the mechanisms 
used to distribute central government funds 
to local authorities6.
Economic reforms
The goal of Moldova’s economic reforms, 
as set by the current government soon after 
taking power in 2009, has been to increase the 
country’s attractiveness to investors, and to 
ensure a continuous and substantial economic 
growth. Over the past three years, the coalition 
government has set up seven Special Economic 
Zones offering favourable conditions for 
business activity (including, VAT and customs 
duties exemptions for manufacturers). 
The government also established three 
industrial estates during this period. Foreign 
companies registered in Moldova were 
6 According to a report by the Expert Group, in 2011 
additional funds from the state budget were allocat-
ed	 to	40%	of	 local	 councils	 ruled	by	mayors	 affiliated	
with	 the	 AIE.	 Meanwhile,	 only	 6.5%	 of	 councils	 led 
by non-partisan mayors, and 3% of councils headed by 
the Communists, received such funds. 
The widespread corruption affecting the 
courts, the prosecution service, and other 
departments under the Ministry of Justice, 
poses a major challenge to the success 
of this reform.
OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 100 4
granted tax breaks linked to the size of their 
investments7. Consequently, these measures 
placed Moldova 83rd in the latest Doing Business 
ranking (up 11 places on June 2009); the same 
ranking also ranked Moldova in the top 10 
of the most successful reformers. Nevertheless, 
the economic reforms attempted by the AIE 
government can be considered unsuccessful, 
particularly in areas such as investment law and 
the protection of property rights. As a result 
Moldova has been losing foreign investors, who 
have complained about difficulties in dealing 
with the local tax office, customs officials and 
the prosecution service. These investors included 
three major international players: the American 
Lear Corporation, Germany’s Dräxlmaier and 
Australia’s Shan Lian Group, all of whom decided 
to cancel their investment plans in Moldova 
in the last two months of 2012. In all cases, 
the companies cited serious problems with 
the Moldovan tax office and customs officials 
as the reason for their decision. As a result, 
Moldova	 lost	 up	 to	 €60	 million,	 i.e.	 25%	 of	
all its foreign direct investment for 2012. 
The investment climate has also suffered due to 
repeated cases of so-called corporate raiding, 
where a majority stake in a company is illegally 
acquired on the basis of a corrupt judicial 
decision. Corporate raiding is made possible 
both because of loopholes in Moldovan law 
and the high levels of corruption among local 
judges. It also offers proof that no major 
7	 For	 the	 first	 five	 years	 of	 their	 operation,	 companies	
with a start-up capital of $250,000 are granted a 50% 
tax break, subject to the reinvestment of at least 80% 
of the saved funds in projects based in Moldova. Com-
panies investing more than $5 million are completely 
exempt	from	income	tax	for	a	period	of	five	years.
changes have been made in the area of property 
rights protection or the fight against corruption. 
This further highlights the fact that the success 
of economic reforms in Moldova is directly 
dependent on the efficiency of judicial reform.
It should be noted, however, that the reforms 
required for signing a DCFTA with the EU 
(scheduled for autumn 2013) have been carried 
out without major problems. Moldova has 
begun amending its Customs Code, the law on 
customs tariffs and the law on free economic 
zones, as well as completing the implementation 
of its fair competition legislation. Other 
changes include the introduction of new anti-
monopoly regulations and a reform of the 
state body responsible for the prevention of 
unfair competition. Moldova’s Parliament has 
passed a law regulating and restricting state 
subsidies for local companies, which protects 
the principle of equality of all businesses 
operating in the free market.
In addition, the AIE coalition has had marked 
success in implementing its energy policy. 
Moldova has joined the Energy Community and 
adopted a series of directives resulting in partial 
regulation of its electricity and gas market. 
The country has also adopted EU energy 
efficiency provisions, with a view to ultimately 
aligning all of its energy law with EU standards. 
Despite some delays, further progress has been 
made	on	the	Iași-Ungheni	pipeline,	designed	to	
link the gas systems of Moldova and Romania, 
and	 thus	 allow	 Chișinău	 to	 end	 its	 complete	
dependence on Russian gas. Completion of the 
project has been scheduled for November 2013.
Reforms in the areas of civil rights 
and liberties
The current coalition has successfully paved 
the way for wide-ranging reforms in the 
area	 of	 civil	 rights	 –	 particularly	 freedom	
of speech, protection of minority rights, 
religious freedom, and implementing major 
changes to the country’s education system. 
The investment climate has suffered due 
to repeated cases of so-called corporate 
raiding, where a majority stake in a com-
pany is illegally acquired on the basis 
of a corrupt judicial decision.
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The government has also liberalised rules on 
freedom of expression, and the local media no 
longer complain about the types of political 
pressure that restricted their work before 2009. 
The Moldovan media market gained new 
television channels as well as a number of 
newspapers and magazines. A recent ranking 
compiled by Reporters Without Borders ranks 
Moldova 53rd,	up	61	places	on	2009.	However,	
over the past two years observers have noticed 
negative trends indicating growing restrictions 
on media freedom. Among the particularly 
worrying developments was the decision 
to strip the pro-Communist opposition NIT 
television channel of its broadcasting licence in 
April 2012. What is also becoming apparent is 
that shares in the country’s media outlets have 
been increasingly bought up by AIE politicians 
or people associated with them, which may 
adversely affect media plurality in the country. 
The adoption of legislation guaranteeing the 
rights of ethnic and sexual minorities and 
religious freedom has suffered delays due to 
continued opposition from Moldova’s rather 
conservative society. In May 2012, however, 
Parliament finally adopted the so-called Equal 
Opportunities Act, which ensures equal legal 
status of minorities, including sexual minorities 
and the Romani population. Previously, 
similar difficulties were experienced in the 
enforcement of the right to freedom of religion. 
Although the appropriate legal framework was 
adopted when the reforms were first launched, 
it was not until March 2011 that the Ministry of 
Justice agreed to register the first non-Christian 
religious group in Moldova. Despite the delays, 
the adoption of the new regulations in both 
cases proves that reform in this area has on the 
whole been successful.
Some success has also been achieved in the 
reform of Moldova’s education system: there 
has been a complete overhaul of the country’s 
primary and secondary schools, local teachers 
have been given a pay rise, and the Bologna 
Process has been implemented in Moldova’s 
universities. The Department for Education has 
begun the implementation of a new national 
curriculum, many schools have been refurbished, 
and the network of existing schools has been 
optimised. The main problems experienced by 
the Moldovan education system are widespread 
corruption, a lack of funding, and shortages of 
fully qualified teachers. The government has 
also been making steady progress in adopting 
regulations aimed at ensuring Moldova’s 
eligibility for visa-free travel to the EU. 
In November 2012, Moldova officially entered 
the second and final phase of the Action Plan 
on Visa Liberalisation, which means that the 
necessary legal framework has been completed 
and its implementation will start soon. It is 
worth noting that the government chose not 
to wait for the EU’s official confirmation of the 
completion of the first phase, and has pressed 
ahead with further reform on its own initiative. 
This	 has	 allowed	 Chișinău	 to	 make	 biometric	
passports available to all its citizens, among 
other measures.
The sources of difficulties
The pace of reform has been affected by 
several factors, including disputes and 
conflicting interests within the ruling 
coalition; the resistance to change from public 
administration; the lack of financial resources, 
the pressure from business lobbyists linked to 
local politicians; and the legacy of the Soviet- 
-era political culture.
Meanwhile, the main problems hampering 
Parliament’s work on new legislation are 
Moldova’s coalition government and the mutual 
distrust among the members of the Alliance 
for European Integration. This issue became 
particularly significant during the two and 
The main problems hampering Parliament’s 
work on new legislation are Moldova’s co-
alition government and the mutual distrust 
among the members of the Alliance for 
European Integration.
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a half-year period of political instability (from 
September 2009 to March 2012) when the 
Moldovan Parliament was unable to elect a new 
head of state. Consequently, throughout this 
period, many ministers and senior officials were 
hesitant to push through radical reforms, fearing 
a lack of stability of the coalition and the Cabinet. 
This in turn led to a delay in reforming the 
Ministry of the Interior, and almost entirely 
halted the debate on reforms to the justice 
system8. However, following the election 
of a new president, the risk of early general 
elections disappeared9, resulting in the 
stabilisation	 of	 Moldova’s	 political	 scene	 – 
at least until the next parliamentary elections, 
which are scheduled for December 2014.
Finally, a significant obstacle to successful 
political and social reform in Moldova has 
been posed by the lack of financial resources. 
It was the lack of sufficient funds, for instance, 
that meant the National Human Rights Action 
Plan for 2011-2014 (adopted in September 
2010) was implemented in a rather haphazard 
manner. The same reason has been cited for 
the delays in the implementation of provisions 
relating to the rights of children, regional 
development, and general administrative 
reform. Similarly, the Anti-Corruption Action 
Plan adopted in February 2012 contains no 
funding provisions and offers no estimate for 
the cost of its implementation; nor does it 
specify the human resources necessary for the 
implementation of the plan. The omission of 
such information appears to be rather common.
8 See. L. Litres, ‘How to avoid the EU fatigue towards Mol-
dova?’, Moldova’s Foreign Policy Statewatch, No. 23, 
May 2011.
9 After two failed attempts to elect a new president, 
the Moldovan parliament must be disbanded.
Another problem, the scale of which is hard to 
judge at this point, is the influence of political 
and business groups on reform processes 
within Moldova. A fundamental reform of the 
justice system is not in the interest of pressure 
groups holding key positions in the Moldovan 
economy, as it might upset the long-established 
corrupt relationships that allow or facilitate 
their business activities. 
The public perception 
of pro-European reform
The majority of reforms undertaken by 
the Moldovan government have not yet 
moved beyond the legislative stage, or are 
awaiting the formation of an institutional 
basis needed for their full implementation. 
This means that the Moldovan people rarely 
notice any concrete outcomes of these 
reforms. The lack of visible effects of these 
changes, and the decision to push through 
unpopular reforms (such as the Law on Equal 
Opportunities, which offers protection to 
sexual minorities among others) have had 
a negative effect on Moldovans’ attitude to 
closer integration with the EU. Recent opinion 
polls show a clear downward trend in the level of 
public support for EU membership. In November 
2012, 54.7% of Moldovans were in favour of 
joining the European Union, while support for the 
Customs Union had increased to 55.8%10. Many 
Moldovans are also deeply unhappy with the 
effects of economic reform and the inefficiency 
of the government’s anti-corruption measures. 
A recent opinion poll conducted by Transparency 
International suggests that nearly 50% of the 
population believed that the level of corruption 
in the country had been on the rise over the 
past 12 months, while 59% of respondents felt 
that the economic situation in the country had 
worsened over the same period. The difficulty 
of the situation is further compounded by the 
lack of an effective, government-led information 
10	Barometrul	de	Opinie	Publică…,	pp.	69-74.	The	results	
do not add up to 100% because respondents could 
choose more than one option. 
The lack of visible effects of these chang-
es, and the decision to push through un-
popular reforms have had a negative effect 
on Moldovans’ attitude to closer integra-
tion with the EU.
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campaign that could increase public awareness 
of the benefits of EU membership.
Assessment of Moldova’s reforms, 
and the outlook for the future
Despite its ambitious reform programme, after 
three and a half years in power, Moldova’s ruling 
Alliance for European Integration has made 
only modest progress in the pro-European 
modernisation of the country. Its systemic 
transformation is still in progress, and much 
of the Soviet legacy remains deeply influential 
in the day-to-day running of state institutions, 
which urgently require extensive structural 
remodelling. The problem is not helped by 
the Soviet-era mentality of public administration 
employees who tend to resist the drive for 
change. At this stage, however, none of 
the changes are irreversible, and a different 
government could easily abandon these reform 
efforts in the future. Structural reforms of 
the state apparatus are therefore the only 
guarantee of a systemic change in Moldova.
The greatest success of the reformist coalition 
has been a marked improvement in the 
democratic standards of the Moldovan electoral 
system, greater media freedom, and fewer 
violations of civil liberties. However, reform of 
the Ministry of the Interior and the judiciary will 
require a lot more determination, political will 
and time. Furthermore, those reforms whose 
implementation has already begun will need 
years before they have any real effect on the 
functioning of the state. This is because the 
changes require a mature institutional base and 
a forward-thinking public administration, both 
of which are only now beginning to emerge.
The future of Moldova’s reforms is contingent on 
the political and economic stability of the country. 
As the next parliamentary elections approach, 
Moldova will begin to witness an intensified 
political struggle between the coalition 
partners, and the government will likely refrain 
from implementing any unpopular reforms. 
The durability of the Moldovan reformist 
experiment will also be tested by the economic 
slowdown which is slowly beginning to affect the 
country, as well as growing pressure from Russia. 
By employing a variety of instruments (including, 
high gas prices), Moscow hopes to dissuade 
Moldova from pursuing its EU aspirations, and 
instead	wants	to	bring	Chișinău	into	the	Customs	
Union. The worsening economic situation, 
general disappointment with the recent reforms, 
and the prospect of concrete benefits resulting 
from membership of the Customs Union could 
cost the AIE its place in government in 2014 and 
lead a pro-Russian party to victory in the next 
general election. Such a turn of events could 
easily undermine the current reform efforts.
The EU is acutely aware of these issues, but 
rarely voices its criticism of the government 
in	 Chișinău.	 Despite	 all	 the	 shortcomings	 of	
Moldova’s reforms, the country remains EU’s 
only ‘success story’ in Eastern Europe, and 
Brussels desperately needs a successful country 
in its Eastern Partnership programme in order to 
demonstrates the scheme’s viability. It is also clear 
that the EU would like to see the implementation 
of Moldova’s reforms as soon as possible; this 
would pave the way for the signing of further 
agreements, which would make Moldova’s 
integration with the European Union irreversible.
